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NONSOLICITATION AND CEASE AND DESIST




The laws of the United States,' New York State, 2 and New York
City3 prohibit "blockbusting" -"attempts by unscrupulous real estate
brokers to induce panic selling of homes and other properties by
spreading the fear of falling real estate values due to the prospective
entry into the neighborhood of persons of another race, religion or
creed." ' 4 By promoting "white flight" or gentrification or both,
blockbusting contributes to neighborhood upheaval.5
* B.A., 1971, Herbert H. Lehman College; M.A., 1974, Hofstra University;
J.D. expected, Dec. 1987, Touro College, Fuchsberg Law Center.
1. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (1982). This law codifies the Fair Housing Act,
or Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 83
(1982). To cross reference sections from the codification of the Act, simply replace
"36" with "8" (for example, § 3604(e) becomes § 804(e)).
2. See N.Y. ComP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 19, § 175.17(a) (1985); see also
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296.3-b (McKinney 1982).
3. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, ch. 2, § 8-204 (1986). Section 8-204 authorizes
the New York City Commission on Human Rights to designate nonsolicitation
areas and requires that a current listing of such areas be available to the public.
See id. These areas are the same areas designated by the Secretary of State. See
infra note 8. In fact, all effective orders originate with the Secretary of State. See
infra note 7 and accompanying text. At least one commentator has criticized the
work of local human rights commissions as weak and ineffective due to procedural
delays, lacking sufficient authority to investigate and enforce, and lacking public
confidence in their effectiveness. See Note, Blockbusting, 59 GEO. L.J. 170, 174
(1970) [hereinafter Blockbusting].
4. See RACIAL STEERING: A GUIDE FOR REAL ESTATE BROKERS, SALESPERSONS,
SELLERS AND PURCHASERS (Secretary of State Pamphlet R105321-002 (Mar. 1982));
see also N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 19, § 178.1(a) (1985).
5. See infra notes 70-85 and accompanying text. Residents of areas experiencing
the "cycle of integration and resegregation" characterize their neighborhoods as
"more fragile and vulnerable than overwhelmingly white areas." Smothers, Housing
Segregation: New Twists and Old Results, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1987, at BI, col.
5. For example, residents believe that the "values of their homes are artificially
depressed and contend that their streets are less clean, the hardships imposed by
absentee landlords are greater, housing code enforcement is less strict and their
community is more likely to be the site of generally unwanted public facilities,
such as shelters for the homeless and drug-treatment centers." Id. at B4, col. 5.
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The purpose of nonsolicitation and cease and desist orders is to
prevent blockbusting. 6 A nonsolicitation order directs "all real estate
brokers and salesmen licensed by the Secretary of State to refrain
from soliciting (initiating the obtaining of listing of properties for
sale and for purchase) in any manner whatsoever." ' 7 The nonsoli-
citation order applies to a designated area, usually a neighborhood
within a county, and lists all streets forming its boundaries.'
In contrast to the nonsolicitation order, a cease and desist order
lists specific individuals within a geographic area who have petitioned
the Secretary of State praying for relief from all solicitation. 9 The
cease and desist order directs brokers to refrain from soliciting the
signers of the petition. 0 Although a broker may solicit anyone who
has not signed the petition in a designated cease and desist area,"
if a majority of the designated community has signed it, it is
impractical for a broker to concentrate his efforts there. 2 In addition,
any inexperienced, aggressive salespersons in %the broker's employ
may compound these problems by approaching the wrong homeowner
and thereby costing the broker his license. 3 Unlike nonsolicitation
6. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 19, § 178.1(a) (1985).
7. Id. § 178.2.
8. See id. § 178.4. Section 178.5 refers to the promulgation of other non-
solicitation orders currently in effect. See id. § 178.5. For maps of the nonsolicitation
areas described in the various orders, see infra Appendix A.
9. See Note, Blockbusting: A Novel Statutory Approach to an Increasingly
Serious Problem, 7 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 538, 556-57 (1971) [hereinafter
Novel Approach]. For a sample of the forms used by the petitioner and the
Secretary of State ordering brokers to cease and desist, see id. at 556-57 nn. 99-
100.
10. See id. at 556-57.
11. The petition will only serve to protect those who sign it from the unwanted
solicitation of real estate brokers. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 19,
§ 175.17(b) (1977).
12. A cease and desist order would frustrate a direct mail campaign because
the commercial mailing lists available to brokers do not take the petitioners into
account. In addition, it would encumber the hiring of door-to-door circular dis-
tributors by requiring them to carry a cease and desist list with them-a single
mistake might unnecessarily expose the broker to sanctions, penalties, or liability.
See infra notes 134-68 and accompanying text. These considerations are sufficient
to dissuade the broker from taking bad risks.
13. The Secretary of State has the authority to issue a cease and desist order
pursuant to the Official Compilation of Codes, Rules and Regulations of the State
of New York. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REos. tit. 19, § 175.17(b) (1985). The
Secretary of State's authority to revoke or suspend a broker's or salesperson's
license arises under article 12-A of the Real Property Law. See N.Y. REAL PROP.
LAW § 441-c (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1987). The broker is liable for the acts of
his salespersons under the doctrine of respondeat superior. See State Comm'n for
Human Rights v. Suburban Assocs., Inc., 55 Misc. 2d 920, 922, 286 N.Y.S.2d
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orders, the Secretary of State does not publish cease and desist
orders, rather, they are cataloged by internal reference numbers. 14
While the only purpose of a nonsolicitation order is to prevent
blockbusting,' 5 a cease and desist order can also curtail solicitation
that is unwelcome because of its manner and volume.' 6 In particular,
this order protects residents of insular, affluent neighborhoods which
are often prime targets for extension of soliciting' 7 by brokers who
seek a commission on a sale that may be worth three or four times
as much as a sale in a middle-class neighborhood.'"
Although nonsolicitation orders may supersede cease and desist
orders,' 9 it is possible that they will not cover the same exact area. 20
733, 737 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1967), modified, 34 A.D.2d 662, 662, 310
N.Y.S.2d 1019, 1019 (2d Dep't 1970) (employer may be held answerable for
discriminatory acts of employee unless he has no knowledge thereof); cf. Whitfield
v. Century 21 Real Estate Corp., 484 F. Supp. 984, 986 (S.D. Tex. 1979) (licensee
granted summary judgment when it did not control marketing practices of franchising
agents); Diona v. Lomenzo, 26 A.D.2d 473, 475, 275 N.Y.S.2d 663, 666 (1st Dep't
1966) (broker unaware of salesperson's improper conduct is not liable). The term
"broker" includes salespersons and persons with related position titles. See N.Y.
EXEc. LAW § 292(14) (McKinney 1982).
14. Outside of Rochester, all existing cease and desist orders are in the metro-
politan New York City area: QUEENS COUNTY: Arverne, Edgemere, Far Rockaway,
Holliswood, Jackson Heights, Jamaica Estates, Richmond Hill, Rosedale, Wood-
haven; NASSAU COUNTY: Elmont, Freeport, Hempstead, North Valley Stream, Union-
dale, Westbury; SUFFOLK COUNTY: Robin Park (Huntington); KINGS COUNTY: not
designated by communities-just known as the "Brooklyn list." Telephone interview
with Bernard Friend, Special Projects Manager, Division of Licenses, New York
State Dep't of State (May 15, 1987); see List of Areas Subject to Nonsolicitation
and Cease and Desist Orders (available at Fordham Urban Law Journal office)
[hereinafter Nonsolicitation Order List].
15. See supra note 6; infra note 17 and accompanying text.
16. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
17. For example, a broker and his agents may launch a campaign of simultaneous
solicitation involving ringing doorbells, mass mailings, street canvassing, distributing
circulars, and the use of sound trucks. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, ch. 2,
§ 8-202 (1986).
18. Brokers make higher commissions with the sale of more expensive homes.
For instance, if a home is sold for $100,000 and the commission is eight percent,
the broker earns $8,000. If a home is sold for $300,000 and the commission is
only six percent, the broker earns $18,000.
19. The nonsolicitation order of August 8, 1985, largely superseded the cease
and desist orders for Elmont and North Valley Stream. See N.Y. COMP. CODES
R. & REGS. tit. 19, § 178.4(4) (1985); see also Thompson v. Lomenzo, 78 Misc.
2d 298, 302, 356 N.Y.S.2d 760, 765 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1974) (cease and desist
order in Brooklyn and Queens superseded by nonsolicitation order of July 8, 1971,
modified by nonsolicitation order of October 31, 1975), aff'd, 48 A.D.2d 869, 369
N.Y.S.2d 191 (2d Dep't 1975); supra note 14.
20. The nonsolicitation order for Kings County dated Oct. 31, 1975, see Non-
solicitation Order List, supra note 14, covers a limited area compared to the cease
and desist order covering Brooklyn. See supra note 19.
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As a result, the cease and desist order may offer effective assistance
to those not protected by the narrower nonsolicitation order. 2' To
date, no nonsolicitation order has been lifted after its promulgation. 22
While four of the five nonsolicitation orders that are still in effect
for the metropolitan New York City area were issued by the Secretary
of State between 1971 and 1977,23 the existence of a more recent
1985 order covering four distinct areas 24 shows that the underlying
problems are neither outdated nor resolved. To the contrary, as long
as New York City remains the melting pot of the western world,
racial and ethnic tensions may be anticipated.25 Nonsolicitation orders
against real estate brokers are not intended as a panacea for neigh-
borhoods in transition, but rather are an attempt to make that
transition smoother, thus promoting economic stability and tran-
quility withou frenzied panic selling or charging of the market by
blockbusters. 26
21. This result is in keeping with the different purposes of the two orders. See
supra notes 6-18 and accompanying text.
22. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 19, § 178.5 (1985).
23. See Nonsolicitation Order List, supra note 14.
24. See id.
25. Indeed, the recent tragic death of a twenty-three-year old black man, Michael
Griffith, exemplifies the continuing racial and ethnic tensions in New York City.
On December 20, 1986, in Howard Beach, Queens, a gang of white teenagers
chased, attacked, and beat Griffith and his two companions, both of whom were
black. See McFadden, Black Man Dies After Beating by Whites in Queens, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 21, 1986, at 1, col. 3. In his attempt to escape, Griffith ran out onto
a highway where a car struck and killed him. See id. Police labeled it a racial
attack. See id.
In fact, recent articles have reported persistent racial discrimination in housing
in New York City. See Smothers, Housing Segregation: New Twists and Old Results,
N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 1987, at BI, col. 5; Bernstein, When Prejudice Hits Home:
Despite Laws, Keeping "Them" Out Persists, N.Y. Newsday, Jan. 26, 1987, at 3,
col. 1.
26. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 19, § 178.1(a) (1985). One might
explain the decline in nonsolicitation orders in New York City by using a demographic
approach. While the black population of New York City increased by 53% between
1960 and 1970, it increased only by 7% between 1970 and 1980. See BUREAU OF
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1980 CENSUS OF POPULATION, GENERAL SOCIAL
AND ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS: NEW YORK STATE Table 58, at 55 (1980) (black
population in New York City was 1,788,337 in 1980) [hereinafter 1980 CENSUS];
BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION,
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POPULATION: NEW YORK STATE Table 23, at 87 (1970)
(black population in New York City was 1,668,115 in 1970) [hereinafter 1970
CENSUS]; BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1960 CENSUS OF POPU-
LATION, GENERAL POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS: NEW YORK STATE Table 21, at
107 (1960) (black population in New, York City was 1,087,931 in 1960) [hereinafter
1960 CENSUS]. The influx of blacks into urban areas during the 1960's created an
increased demand for housing which persisted into the 1970's. This demand,
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Nonsolicitation and cease and desist orders, however, are limited
tools with limited effects.2 7 While they effectively target local brokers
of victimized neighborhoods to enable transitions to occur without
undue influence, 2 their means of enforcement must be improved. 29
This Article will trace the origin, growth and enforcement of
nonsolicitation and cease and desist orders. Part II outlines the
federal framework for dealing with discriminatory practices by real
estate brokers.30 Section A focuses on "steering" 31-the target of
cease and desist orders-and illustrates the dilemma of both the
victims and the brokers. Section B details blockbusting-the target
of nonsolicitation orders. In discussing its genesis, financial oper-
ation, and sociological implications, this section also considers whether
solicitation by brokers constitutes "commercial speech" protected
by the first amendment. Section C briefly explores the effectiveness
of section 1982 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 as a remedy against
racial discrimination in housing. Section D examines whether subtle
behavior, language, and mannerisms employed by brokers in steering
and blockbusting are elements that establish intent to discriminate.
Part III considers the New York response to steering and block-
busting.32 Section A outlines the various applicable laws, rules, and
however, was common to various groups of immigrants. The Chinese population
in New York City increased from 32,831 in 1960, see 1960 CENSUS, supra, Table
21, at 107, to 69,324 in 1970, see 1970 CENSUS, supra, Table 23, at 87, to 124,372
in 1980. See 1980 CENSUS, supra, Table 58, at 55. The Filipino population in New
York City increased from 4,281 in 1960, see 1960 CENSUS, supra, Table 21, at
107, to 11,207 in 1970, see 1970 CENSUS, supra, Table 23, at 87, to 25,391 in
1980. See 1980 CENSUS, supra, Table 58, at 55. The city has historically represented
opportunity and the "better life," but when rural masses flocked to central cities,
they found deteriorating ghettoes, dwindling opportunities, and "white flight" to
the suburbs. See Daye, The Race, Class and Housing Conundrum: A Rationale
and Proposal for a Legislative Policy of Suburban Inclusion, 9 N.C.C. L.J. 37
(1977) [hereinafter Daye]. Census reports revealed that New York City's white
population dropped from 6,048,841 in 1970, see 1970 CENSUS, supra, Table 23, at
87, to 4,348,605 in 1980, a 29% drop. See 1980 CENSUS, supra, Table 58, at 55.
Because of a dramatic rise in New York City housing costs in the past decade
and a reversal in the trend of "white flight"-known as gentrification, the statistical
significance of which has yet to be comprehensively evaluated- whites are returning
to black neighborhoods with developers making speculative purchases of depressed
housing areas undergoing revitalization.
27. See infra notes 134-75 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 169-75 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 176-80 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 35-125 and accompanying text.
31. See infra note 52 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 126-75 and accompanying text.
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codes and demonstrates the difficulty in pursuing a cause of action
or complaint. Section B discusses hearings, license suspensions, and
revocations by the Secretary of State, and examines Article 78 pro-
ceedings that provide judicial review of the determination of the
Secretary of State. Section C reviews Article 15 (the Human Rights
Law) of the Executive Law,33 which is New York's comprehensive
counterpart to the federal Fair Housing Act.34 Section D examines
the Secretary's statutory authority to impose penalties. This Section
compares the effectiveness of these penalties with that of nonsoli-
citation and cease and desist orders.
This Article concludes that while nonsolicitation and cease and
desist orders do not mitigate the effects of racial tension, they do
effectively target local brokers who victimize neighborhoods. The
Article, therefore, includes recommendations to enhance the efficient
administration and implementation of these orders.
II. Federal Response to Discriminatory Practices by
Real Estate Brokers
Congress enacted Title VIII-The Federal Fair Housing Act-of
the Civil Rights Act of 196831 "to encourage the dispersal of the
urban ghettos that had experienced rioting and disorder in the sum-
mers of 1965 through 1968."36 To achieve this objective, Congress
prohibited discriminatory practices that tended to exclude blacks
from white suburbs.37 Striving to make Title VIII a comprehensive,
open housing law, Congress declared that its policy was to assure
"fair housing throughout the United States." 38 Yet Title VIII does
not describe discrimination in terms of either purpose or effect.3 9
Since the intent of Congress was to ban racial and other forms of
discrimination by real estate agents in the sale and rental of housing, 40
the courts have broadly construed the Act.4'
33. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 290 (McKinney 1982).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1982).
35. See id.
36. Note, Racial Steering: The Real Estate Broker and Title VIII, 85 YALE L.J.
808, 822 (1976) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter Racial Steering].
37. See id.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1982).
39. See id. § 3602(f). This section only refers to unlawful acts described in
§§ 3604-3606. See Schwemm, Discriminatory Effect and The Fair Housing Act,
54 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 199, 202 (1978) [hereinafter Fair Housing Act].
40. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a)-(e) (1982).
41. See Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413-17 (1968) (dictum); Zuch v.
Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1046 (E.D. Mich. 1975), aff'd, 547 F.2d 1168 (6th
Cir. 1977); see, e.g., United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973).
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Section 3604 of the Act prohibits: (1) refusal to deal; 42 (2) dis-
crimination as to terms; 43 (3) discriminatory advertising;" (4) false
representations to any person that a dwelling is unavailable for sale
or rental;45 and (5) representations, whether true or false, to induce
a person to sell or rent a dwelling because of the entry "into the
neighborhood of a person ...of a particular race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. ' 46 The first four prohibitions protect persons
against the actions by the owner who sells or rents a dwelling. 47 In
contrast, the last section intends to protect the owner of a dwelling
against representations by persons intending to induce panic selling.
48
This Article focuses on the first and fifth prohibitions: steering
49
and blockbusting. 0
A. The Fair Housing Act: Steering
Without explicitly using the term, section 3604(a) of the Act
prohibits steering.5" Steering occurs when a real estate broker directs
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1982).
43. See id. § 3604(b).
44. See id. § 3604(c).
45. See id. § 3604(d).
46. See id. § 3604(e).
47. See United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305, 1309 (D. Md. 1969).
48. See id. The most notable exemption under the Fair Housing Act is for
owners of single-family homes or dwellings occupied by no more than four house-
holds, one of which is occupied by the owner. See 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) (1982).
This exemption applies when the owners do not employ brokerage services or
procure commercial advertisement. See id. For a discussion of the legislative debate
of this provision, known as the "Mrs. Murphy exception," see Note, Recent
Decisions, Racial Discrimination-Fair Housing Act, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 615,
627-28 n.139 (1978) [hereinafter Recent Decisions]. Passage of the bill hinged upon
reconciliation of views favoring either a narrowing or broadening of this exemption.
While such owners escape prosecution under the Act, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 3612-3613
(1982) (prosecution), the exemption does not immunize blockbusting brokers who
solicit single-family homeowners. See United States v. Mintzes, .304 F. Supp. at
1309. Although the single-family homeowner does not need an exemption from the
anti-blockbusting prohibitions of § 3604(c), see id., providing an exemption for
the blockbusting broker denies protection to the group most in need of it. See
UNITED STATES COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN: EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING 88 (1975) [hereinafter TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN].
If a broker were permitted to enjoy the exemption under § 3603(b), then § 3604(e),
the anti-blockbusting provision, would be meaningless. See infra notes 70-85 and
accompanying text for a discussion of § 3603(e).
49. See infra notes 51-69 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 70-95 and accompanying text.
51. See Zuqh v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1048 (E.D. Mich. 1975) ("[t]he
[c]ourt, therefore, concludes as a matter of law that steering is a violation of
Section 3604(a) of the Fair Housing Law"). One commentator has also argued
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a buyer toward or away from particular neighborhoods because of
the buyer's race.12 It is thus the converse of blockbusting-the
blockbuster makes race-related representations to sellers in order to
depress the price of homes, while the steering broker makes such
representations to buyers with the intent of increasing the prices of
houses. 3 Typically, the white steerer will tell white buyers to stay
away from an area because "it's black" or will tell black buyers
that no homes are available in white neighborhoods.14 A broker
steers pursuant to the instructions of sellers or preferences of buyers. 5
At best, a broker might assume. that buyers prefer to live with others
of their own race and, at worst, a broker might steer in combination
with a blockbusting strategy 5 6 with the result of pushing black buyers
into changing neighborhoods. Sometimes a broker steers as the result
of the baiting of an overzealous tester.5 7
It is widely believed that neither legislative efforts nor a purported
shift in social values will eliminate steering by real estate brokers, 8
that § 3604(b)'s prohibition against discrimination applies to buyers steered by real
estate brokers and establishes a legal "colorblind" standard. See Racial Steering,
supra note 36, at 819. While § 3604(a) supports the first proposition, see 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604(a) (1982), Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978), has held that the Constitution is not colorblind-and the Court has "expressly
rejected this proposition on a number of occasions." Id. at 356.
52. See Racial Steering, supra note 36, at 809. Steering is also known as
gatekeeping and neighborhood shaping. See id.
53. See Note, Housing and Section 1982: The Advisability of Extending the
Statutory Mandate Beyond Acts of Traditional Discrimination, 1975 DUKE L.J.
781, 799-800 n.80 [hereinafter Housing and Section 1982].
54. Steering is not limited to white brokers. One of the ironies in Zuch was
that the court enjoined several black real estate agencies from providing services
that their clients were unable to obtain from white brokers. See Zuch, 394 F. Supp.
at 1054 n.12.
55. See Racial Steering, supra note 36, at 810-11.
56. See id. at 811-12.
57. See id. at 812; see also Village of Bellwood v. Dwayne Realty, 482 F. Supp.
1321 (N.D. I11. 1979) (testimony of testers discounted due to interest in outcome
of litigation); Millspaugh, Fair Housing Testing: Its Legal Status and Policy Im-
plications, 13 U. BALT. L. REV. 215, 230-34 (1984) (discussing credibility of tester
evidence) [hereinafter Millspaugh].
58. E. BISKIND, LAW OF REAL ESTATE BROKERS § 37(1) (1969 & Supp. 1983)
[hereinafter BISKIND]; Racial Steering, supra note 36, at 811. For a first-hand field
study of steering, see R. HELPER, RACIAL POLICIES AND PRACTICES OF REAL ESTATE
BROKERS (1969). This study, however, focuses on the Chicago area and is dated.
See id. This writer has not found any discussions either sympathetic to, or in
defense of, brokers. To the contrary, articles hostile to brokers are more typical.
See, e.g., Leland, Going for Broker, 4 CAL. LAW. 15-16 (Aug. 1984). There have
been several legislative efforts to curb steering. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8,
ch. 2, § 8-203 (1986); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(5)(a)-(c) (McKinney 1982).
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a practice historically encouraged by the industry.5 9 A contrary view,
however, notes that the standard texts used in real estate salespersons
courses6w-courses required for licensing in -New York6 1-emphasize
high ethical standards and the duty to comply with laws targeting
racial discrimination. 62 Furthermore, brokers know that testers exist
and, therefore, commonly protect their licenses by instructing their
staff never to broach the subject of race and to move away from
it whenever the client raises the question. 63
Since the broker-defendant charged with a violation of section
3604(a) is unlikely to admit his guilt, the use of testers is frequently
the only method available for gathering competent evidence of un-
lawful activity.M Although section 3604(a) covers refusals to deal
only after a bona fide offer has been made, courts have upheld the
use of testers as a means of showing section 3604(a) violations
because section 3604(a) also prohibits the unlawful practice of "oth-
erwise" making housing unavailable. 65 Many lower federal courts
have held that plaintiff-testers who find discrimination in the course
of their investigations have standing to sue under article III of the
United States Constitution. 66
59. Until 1950, Article 34 of the National Association of Real Estate Brokers'
Code of Ethics stated: "A realtor should never be instrumental in introducing into
a neighborhood a character of property or occupancy, members of any race or
nationality, or any individual whose presence would clearly be detrimental to property
values in that neighborhood." National Ass'n of Real Estate Brokers' Code of
Ethics, quoted in, BISKIND, supra note 58, § 37(1) n.18 lb.
60. E.g., N. WEINBERG, P. COLLETTI, W. COLAVITO, & F. MELCHIOR, GUIDE
TO TIE NEW YORK REAL ESTATE SALESPERSONS' COURSE (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter
WEINBERG].
61. See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW §§ 440-a, 441 (McKinney 1971). -
62. WEINBERG, supra note 60, at 175-90. Article 10 of the National Association
of Realtors' Code of Ethics now states, in pertinent part: "The Realtor shall not
deny equal professional services to any person for reasons of race, creed, sex, or
country of national origin," Id. at 185 (quoting National Association of Real Estate
Brokers' Code of Ethics).
63. While this practice may reflect personal experience, encouragement of racial
steering by brokers invites financial suicide. See, e.g., Kranzler Realty, Inc. v.
Department of State, 76 A.D.2d 901, 429 N.Y.S.2d 244 (2d Dep't 1980) (broker's
license suspended); see also Notice of Proposed Settlement, Mandel v. Fresh Mead-
ows Assocs., Newsday, July 18, 1986, at 7, col. 2 (E.D.N.Y. June 19, 1986). But
cf. Blockbusting, supra note 3, at 172 (industry failed to police itself).
64. See Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1051 (E.D. Mich. 1975), aff'd,
547 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1977).
65. See id. at 1047, 1051.
66. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 549 (1967) (bus terminals); Evers v.
Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202, 204 (1958) (buses); Wharton v. Knefel, 562 F.2d 550, 554
19871
FORDHAM URBAN LA W JOURNAL
At least three legitimate objections, however, may be raised against
the use of testers. 67 First, real estate agencies that do not discriminate
against clients based upon race or national origin waste time and
money interviewing and chauffeuring testers with no interest in pur-
chasing a home. Second, the preference of some whites and some
blacks to live with members of their own race cannot be ignored. 61
Third, charges of steering may be misleading. For example, an
inexperienced, part-time salesperson may be unable to locate a home
fitting the actual specifications of a black tester. If a white tester
subsequently goes to the same real estate agency, but deals with an
experienced, full-time broker, it is possible that the more experienced
broker may be able to locate a home meeting those same specifi-
cations. Is it fair under these circumstances for the broker to lose
his license? To minimize this problem, the use of testers should be
targeted against particular real estate agencies that have had com-
plaints filed against them. A proliferation of random testing-which
might be called broker-busting-can be as invidious as blockbusting. 69
B. The Fair Housing Act: Blockbusting
Section 3604(e), the anti-blockbusting provision of the Fair Housing
Act, states that "it shall be unlawful [f]or profit, to induce or
n.18 (8th Cir. 1977) (use of "checkers" to obtain evidence in discrimination cases
has been uniformly accepted); United States v. Youritan Constr. Co., 370 F. Supp.
643, 650 (N.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd as modified, 509 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1975);
Williamson v. Hampton Management Co., 339 F. Supp. 1146, 1148 (N.D. I11.
1972) (housing); Brown v. Ballas, 331 F. Supp. 1033, 1035 (N.D. Tex. 1971)
(housing); Comment, Fair Housing-The Use of Testers to Enforce Fair Housing
Laws-When Testers are Sued, 21 ST. Louis U.L.J. 170, 191 (1977) [hereinafter
Comment, Fair Housing]; see also Schwemm, Standing to Sue in Fair Housing
Cases, 41 OIo ST. L.J. 1 (1980) (while many courts have found testers have
standing to sue, issue remains unresolved) [hereinafter Standing to Sue]. It is notable
that whites also have standing to sue under Title VIII. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.,
396 U.S. 229, 237 (1969); Walker v. Pointer, 304 F. Supp. 56, 60 (N.D. Tex.
1969); TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN, supra note 48, at 89.
67. This Article does not discuss those objections manifested in state and local
prohibitions against the use of testers since no such laws exist in New York. See
Comment, Fair Housing, supra note 66, at 192.
68. See Housing and Section 1982, supra note 53, at 802. This preference is,
of course, not limited to members of different races and applies with equal force
to various ethnic groups. See TixE, July 8, 1985, at 52 (providing map of New
York City's ethnic population concentrations); cf. Racial Steering, supra note 36,
at 823 n.57 (buyers would purchase homes in areas inhabited by members of
different races if not steered away).
69. As a result of such abuses, brokers bring charges of entrapment. See Zuch




attempt to induce any person to sell or rent any dwelling by rep-
resentations regarding the entry or prospective entry into the neigh-
borhood of a person or persons of a particular race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin. ' 70 This section has survived various consti-
tutional challenges, primarily as a valid exercise of congressional
power to enforce the provisions of the thirteenth amendment.7
Blockbusting does not occur in a vacuum. It is best viewed as
a process with several stages of development:
First, a sense of panic and urgency immediately grips the neigh-
borhood and rumors circulate and recirculate about the extent of
the intrusion (real or fancied), the effect on property values and
the quality of education. Second, there are sales and rumors of
sales, some true, some false. Third, the frenzied listing and sale
of houses attracts real estate agents like flies to a leaking jug of
honey. Fourth, even those owners who do not sell are sorely
tempted as their neighbors move laway, and hence those who
remain are peculiarly vulnerable. Fifth , the namnes of successful
agents are exchanged and recommended between homeowners and
frequently the agents are called by the owners themselves, if not
to make a listing then at least to get an up-to-date appraisal.
Constant solicitation of listings goes on by all agents either by
house-to-house calls and/or by mail and/or by telephone, to the
point where owners and residents are driven almost to distraction. 2
The only party who gains financially as a result of blockbusting is
the broker. Both the white seller and the black purchaser lose in
the exchange: the white seller sells in an artificially deflated market,
and the black buyer pays an exorbitant amount for his home while
unwittingly facilitating an increase in segregated housing.7 3 In con-
trast, the blockbuster is frequently instrumental in financing the
purchase of the house with a mortgage arranged through his own
lending institution that is based upon fair market value-not the
deflated purchase price. He then reaps immediate profits upon the
70. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (1982).
71. See United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115, 120 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973); United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp.
1305, 1313 (D. Md. 1969). The Mintzes court dismissed fourteenth amendment
challenges due to an absence of state action. SeeMintzes, 304 F. Supp. at 1312.
But cf. Daye, supra note 26, at 44 ("separate but equal" analysis under Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), still relevant).
72. Zuch, 394 F. Supp. at 1049 (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 335 F.
Supp. 1004, 1005-06 (N.D. Ga. 1971)).
73. See Blockbusting, supra note 3, at 170.
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sale of the house,7' and accumulates cash reserves sufficient to execute
future blockbusting activities. 75 Even organized crime can enter the
scheme, when the blockbuster conspires with a real estate developer
willing to finance and reward the broker for securing and assembling
a group of connected properties that the developer subsequently
converts into an apartment building complex.76
The havoc wrought by blockbusters, however, is of a much greater
dimension than the resulting financial losses and the uprooting of
victims. Neighborhoods in transition, whether by blockbusting or
other means, tend to lose the political force necessary to command
effective municipal services-chaos and deterioration combine to
crush community spirit.7"
While minorities suffer the most from discrimination in housing,78
"[a]nti-blockbusting legislation .. .alleviates only the symptoms Of
the problem by salving the nerves of white homeowners, fearful of
the arrival of black neighbors. ' 79 As a result, the plaintiffs in
blockbusting cases are largely white homeowners with community
roots. 0 The recent black arrivals, who have a belated appreciation
of the less favorable terms or the higher prices charged," comprise
a much smaller group of plaintiffs.8 2
Real estate brokers have defended themselves against charges of
blockbusting by countering that white plaintiffs seek to destroy their
businesses solely because they deal with blacks.83 Bigotry, however,
may not be the white homeowner's motivation. For the white home-
74. See Novel Approach, supra note 9, at 550.
75. See id.
76. The facts in Mintzes suggested this hypothetical situtation. See Mintzes, 304
F. Supp. at 1310.
77. See Smothers, Housing Segregation: New Twists and Old Results, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 1, 1987, at B4, col. 5; Blockbusting, supra note 3, at 176 ("Islince
blockbusting causes rapid transition and the newcomers are not an organized group,
deterioration can occur before community concern can develop and create effective
social control)."
78. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972).
79. Novel Approach, supra note 9, at 552.
80. See Zuch, 394 F. Supp. at 1034.
81. See, e.g., Contract Buyers League v. F & F Inv., 300 F. Supp. 210 (N.D.
I11.), aff'd sub nom. Baker v. F & F Inv., 420 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970).
82. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
83. See Zuch, 394 F. Supp. at 1030. Facing charges of blockbusting, brokers
may even lament, " '[i]f we don't sell to colored [people], we're bigots. If we do,
we're blockbusters.' " Novel Approach, supra note 9, at 551 (quoting N.Y. Times,
Dec. 9, 1969, at 57, col. 4).
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owner who is house-rich and cash-poor, his house may represent
the only nest egg available for security and retirement. Even if he
steadfastly advocates mutual tolerance and respect among races, the
fear of losing the only substantial asset his family possesses, resulting
directly from an influx of blacks, is enough to send him running
to the open arms of the blockbuster. If he has lived on a white
block for many years and has made many friends among his neigh-
bors, his sale to a black may create instant enemies-again, not
because of bigotry, but because of financial panic. White flight is,
therefore, not necessarily irrational.
Blockbusting usually does not occur in a stable, all-white com-
munity, rather, it ripens when the number of blacks in the neigh-
borhood reaches about fifteen percent of the population.8 4 The arrival
of one black family in a white neighborhood does not signify that
the whole neighborhood is "changing." This situation is especially
true in affluent, suburban communities, such as Great Neck, New
York.85 Thus, blockbusting is basically a middle-class phenome-
non: those stricken with poverty or blessed with fortunes remain
unscathed.
As previously mentioned, the purpose of nonsolicitation orders is
to prevent blockbusting. 6 While realtors have challenged these orders
as an abridgment of freedom of speech protected by the first amend-
ment, New York courts have upheld them.87 Moreover, federal courts
have held uniformly that section 3604(e) does not contravene the
first amendment. 8 The rationale underlying these decisions is that
statements containing racially discriminatory remarks made by block-
busting brokers to prospective clients are unprotected speech.8 9 In
addition, while the Constitution protects commercial speech, this
protection is not absolute. 9° Commercial speech is subject to re-
striction when government interests are substantial.9'
84. See Novel Approach, supra note 9, at 543.
85. Great Neck has a reputation for wealth and exclusivity in the metropolitan
New York City area similar to that of Beverly Hills in Los Angeles, California.
86. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying' text.
87. See, e.g., Thomas v. Lomenzo, 78 Misc. 2d 298, 356 N.Y.S.2d 760 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County 1974), aff'd, 48 A.D.2d 869, 369 N.Y.S.2d 191 (2d Dep't 1975).
88. See United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 934 (1972); United States v. Mitchell, 327 F. Supp. 476, 486 (N.D. Ga.
1971); United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 313 F. Supp. 870, 872 (N.D.
Ga. 1970); United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305, 1312 (D. Md. 1969).
89. See Note, Real Estate Steering and the Fair Housing Act of 1968, 12 TULSA
L.J. 758, 765 (1977).
90. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
91. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
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In New York the prohibition against solicitation also applies to
letters, telephone calls, window signs, handbills, and pennysavers. 92
It does not extend, however, to advertisements in newspapers of
general circulation or advertisements on radio and television. 93 Yet
classified ads that include discriminatory language such as "apartment
available in white home" violate section 3604(c) of the Federal Fair
Housing Act.94 The posting of truthful signs on real estate that
indicate "For Sale" or "Sold" with the broker's name is protected
commercial speech 95
C. Section 1982 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866
Section 1982 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 guarantees that
United States citizens "have the same right, in every [s]tate and
[t]erritory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property. ' 96 Although
section 1982 remained virtually dormant for over one hundred years, 97
the Supreme Court activated section 1982 in 1968, declaring that it
"bars all racial discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale
Inc., was the first major case advancing "commercial speech." 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557
(1980), established the "four-step analysis" test to be utilized in determining whether
a government restriction of "commercial speech" will survive constitutional scrutiny:
(1) The expression must concern lawful, truthful, and forthright activity; (2) The
asserted government interest may not be substantial or, if it is-(3) the regulation
must directly advance the interest and (4) the regulation may not be more extensive
than is necessary to serve the interest. See id. at 566. Since § 3604(e) prohibits a
broker from encouraging a homeowner to sell because blacks are changing the face
of the neighborhood, see 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) (1982), the first part of the test is
dispositive. Even if it were not, the state would still have a strong interest in
preventing panic-induced selling and community upheaval.
92. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 19, § 178.2 (1977); see also Eagle
v. Paterson, 83 A.D.2d 837, 837, 441 N.Y.S.2d 566, 567 (2d Dep't 1981), aff'd,
57 N.Y.2d 831, 442 N.E.2d 56, 455 N.Y.S.2d 759 (1982) (Pennysaver delivery
violating cease and desist order).
93. See SOME QUESTIONS AND ANSWERs ABOUT THE NON-SOLICITATION ORDER
(unpublished public information by Secretary of State). Examples of publications
of general circulation include The New York Times, The New York Post, The
Daily News, El Diario, The Village Voice, and The Irish Echo. See id.
94. United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 221 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 934 (1972).
95. See Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1982).




or rental of property, and that the statute, thus construed, is a valid
exercise of the power of Congress to enforce the [t]hirteenth
[a]mendment." 98 Furthermore, the Court held that the enactment of
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 "had no effect upon
[section] 1982." 99
Hence, in view of the independence of Title VIII from section
1982, different tests for standing to sue'0° and different standards
of proof apply. 101 In addition, while Title VIII exempts sales by
owners of single-family homes who do not use brokers or commercial
advertising,10 2 section 1982 categorically prohibits white homeowners
from discriminating against blacks when selling their homes. 03
Plaintiffs may bring section 1982 and Title VIII claims in both
federal and state courts. °4 Section 3610(d) of Title VIII, however,
provides that state claims pre-empt federal claims.'10 Thus, an ad-
vantage in using section 1982 is that it cannot be pre-empted by
state or local law.' °6
Although section 1982 does not specifically provide for payment
of damages, the Supreme Court has encouraged equitable remedies.10 7
98. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 413 (1968) (emphasis in
original); see also Racial Steering, supra note 36, at 813 n.23 (arguments for
application of § 1982 to steering).
99. Jones, 392 U.S. at 416.
100. See Standing to Sue, supra note 66, at 15. In Trafficante v. Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co., the Court found it "unnecessary to reach the question of
standing to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1982" because the plaintiffs could proceed
under the Fair Housing Act. 409 U.S. at 209 n.8. Professor Schwemm, however,
suggests that § 1982 standing may be broader than standing under the Fair Housing
Act, but the Supreme Court has not specifically decided the issue. See Standing
to Sue, supra note 66, at 16. For instance, "a membership share in a neighborhood
recreational facility clearly comes within its [§ 1982] scope even though it might
not be considered a 'dwelling' under Title VIII." Id.
101. See Fair Housing Act, supra note 39, at 232. A number of lower court
decisions have distinguished between the Title VIII and § 1982 standards and have
indicated that proof of racial intent is required in a § 1982 case. See id. at 234
(citing Ortega v. Merit Ins. Co., 433 F. Supp. 135, 143 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1977);
Stingley v. City of Lincoln Park, 429 F. Supp. 1379, 1385 (E.D. Mich. 1977);
Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 425 F. Supp. 987, 1024 (E.D. Pa. 1976)).
102. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
103. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 413, 421; Racial Steering, supra note 36, at 824
n.60; see also Comment, Fair Housing, supra note 66, at 176; cf. Blockbusting,
supra note 3, at 175 (whites enjoy no relief under § 1982).
104. See Standing to Sue, supra note 66, at 12.
105. "[N]o such civil action may be brought in any United States district court
if the person aggrieved has a judicial remedy under a State or local fair housing
law .... ." 42 U.S.C. § 3610(d) (1982).
106. See Comment, Fair Housing, supra note 66, at 176.
107. See Jones, 392 U.S. at 414 n.13.
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Following this lead, federal courts have awarded compensatory and
punitive damages as well as attorney fees under section 1982.108 In
contrast, Title VIII specifically provides for actual damages, up to
$1,000 in punitive damages, court costs, and attorney fees."°9
D. Behavior, Language, and Intent
Discriminatory real estate practices, such as blockbusting and steer-
ing, are frequently covert and involve subtle activity, language, and
manner." 0 A court, therefore, must consider the totality of circum-
stances in each case before rendering a judgment. Subtle activity
occurs when realtors employ black real estate salespersons. to visit
white residents for the purpose of soliciting listings."' In such cir-
cumstances, the conversation, conducted in neutral business terms,
contains no discriminatory representations. The homeowner, how-
ever, may readily perceive the writing on the wall. Blockbusters also
engage in less subtle tactics such as advertising white-owned homes
in newspapers of exclusively black circulation." 2
Realtors commonly employ ambiguous language such as neigh-
borhoods "changing" or "maintaining the status quo.""' 3 In ad-
dition, information that is neutral on its face may be transformed
into advice when communicated in an animated voice with a raised
eyebrow." 4 Since section 3604(e) prohibits both inducement and
108. See TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN, supra note 48, at 87.
109. See 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1968). The absence of similar remedies for successful
defendants has engendered resentment and charges of frivolous litigation. Courts,
however, rarely refer to the litigation as frivolous. Rather, they dismiss § 3612
cases for insufficient evidence. See, e.g., Village of Bellwood v. Dwayne Realty,
482 F. Supp. 1321, 1333 (N.D. I11. 1979) (witnesses not credible); Stingley. v. City
of Lincoln Park, 429 F. Supp. 1379, 1386 (E.D. Mich. 1977) ("total absence of
any proofs relative to a racially discriminatory intent"). In recognition of the general
problem, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were amended on August 1, 1983,
to hold attorneys more accountable and even to impose sanctions for irresponsible
pleadings, motions, and discovery practices. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; Hall, New
Rules Amendments Are Far Reaching, 69 A.B.A. J. 1640 (Nov. 1983).
110. See supra notes 51-95 and accompanying text.
111. See Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1031 n.2 (E.D. Mich. 1975), aff'd,
547 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1977).
112. See Butterly & Green, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 36 N.Y.2d 250, 254-55, 326 N.E.2d
799, 802, 367 N.Y.S.2d 230, 233 (1975); Novel Approach, supra note 9, at 550.
113. See Kranzler Realty, Inc. v. Department of State, 76 A.D.2d 901, 902, 429
N.Y.S.2d 244, 246 (2d Dep't 1980). See generally United States v. Mitchell, 327
F. Supp. 476, 479 (N.D. Ga. 1971) (reasonable man standard applied to "subtle"
statements in § 3604(e) cases).
114. See Racial Steering, supra note 36, at 815 n.29.
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attempted inducement of sellers based upon racial representations,
such representations need not be false or successful to be actionable." 5
As long as a seller makes a representation proscribed by section
3604(e), the requisite intent to blockbust exists."16 Title VIII plaintiffs
charging municipalities with blockbusting need not produce evidence
of overt bigotry nor direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimi-
natory intent. 117 In contrast, a section 1982 plaintiff bringing an
action against an individual homeowner or a small landlord not
covered by Title VIII-the section 3603(b) exemption"-would have
to prove intentional discrimination." 9 Discriminatory effect would
probably be insufficient to show intent. 20
Representations regarding the racial composition of a neighborhood
that do not exhibit discriminatory intent, but are honest answers to
innocent questions from brokers' clients do not violate blockbusting
or steering prohibitions.' 2' Thus, if a buyer asks, "What kind of
people live in Laurelton?," it is proper for the broker to respond
"It's a mixed neighborhood." A response that "It's mixed, you
don't want to live there," however, would constitute overt steering.
Likewise, a response that "It's a mixed neighborhood," with a
simultaneous head shake, hand wave, or sneer would also constitute
steering. 12
115. See Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1048 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (success),
aff'd, 547 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. 1305,
1309 (D. Md. 1969); Forman Enters. v. Department of State, 58 A.D.2d 801, 801,
396 N.Y.S.2d 250, 250 (2d Dep't 1977) (untrustworthiness demonstrated by racially
discriminatory remarks); Blockbusting, supra note 3, at 176 (falsity).
116. See Mintzes, 304 F. Supp at 1311; cf. Racial Steering, supra note 36, at
818 ("broker should be liable even if he does not intend to deny the buyer available
housing").
117. See Recent Decisions, supra note 48, at 632.
118. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
119. See Fair Housing Act, supra note 39, at 234.
120. See id. (discussing impact of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976),
upon § 1982); see also Millspaugh, supra note 57, at 225-30 (some courts recognize
difficulty of proving defendant's discriminatory intent by using "prima facie rule"
requiring plaintiff to show: (1) he is a member of a minority; (2)'he applied and
was qualified for the housing sought; (3) he was rejected; and (4) the opportunity
sought remained open); Selig, The Justice Department and Racially Exclusionary
Municipal Practices: Creative Ventures in Fair Housing Act Enforcement, 17 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 445, 463-65 (1984) (discriminatory effects test would advance essential
goals of Title VIII) [hereinafter Selig].
121. See Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. at 1312; Abel v. Lomenzo, 25 A.D.2d 104, 106,
267 N.Y.S.2d 265, 266 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 18 N.Y.2d 619, 219 N.E.2d 287, 272
N.Y.S.2d 771 (1966); Novel Approach, supra note 9, at 571; see also N.Y.C.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, ch. 2, § 8-204 (1986).
122. See supra note 121.
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If a seller asks whether the influx of blacks into his neighborhood
is causing depressed home values, the broker can provide a market
analysis based upon his actual records comparing the prices of homes
sold in the immediate neighborhood six months ago and at the
present time. Even if he honestly believes so, the broker should not
say that the influx of blacks depresses the value of homes or that
unless the homeowner sells soon the value will continue to drop.' 23
These representations are the direct target of section 3604(e) pro-
hibitions.1 24 Although the broker may respond to a question of the
seller concerning the prospective buyer's race, the seller is liable
under both section 3604(a) and section 1982 if he refuses to deal
with the black buyer-the immunity of sellers under section 3603(b)
applies only where the seller does not employ brokers. 125
III. New York's Response to Discrimination in Housing
Five basic bodies of law in New York govern proceedings involving
discrimination in housing: (1) the State Administrative Procedure
Act; 126 (2) the Executive Law's Article 15 (Human Rights Law);' 27
(3) Title 8 of the Administrative Code of City of New York; 2 (4)
Article 12-A of the Real Property Law, especially section 441-c.1; 2 9
and (5) Title 19 of the Official Compilation of Codes, Rules and
Regulations. 30 In addition, courts make reference to the Civil Practice
Law and Rules.' Since this Article has previously discussed the
123. See id.
124. See Mintzes, 304 F. Supp. at 1309.
125. See id.
126. See N.Y. ADMIN. PROC. ACT § 306 (McKinney 1984); see also infra notes
134-50 and accompanying text.
127. See N.Y. ExEc. LAW §§ 90, 296 (McKinney 1982); see also infra notes 151-
60 and accompanying text.
128. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, ch. 2, § 8-203 (1986).
129. See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 441 (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1987); see also
infra notes 161-68 and accompanying text.
130. See N.Y. Comp. CODEs R. & REGs. tit. 19, §§ 175.17, 178.1 to -.5 (1985).
131. See N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. § 7803(3) (McKinney 1981); see also infra
notes 143-45 and accompanying text.
While application of penal codes and laws may some day be common, currently
such enforcement is rare. Sections 442-e of the Real Property Law and section 8-
Ill of the Administrative Code of the City of New York punish violations of
human rights laws as misdemeanors. See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW§ 442 (McKinney
1968); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, ch. 2, § 8-111 (1969). To date, however, no
prosecutions pursuant to these penal sections have been noted. Telephone interview
with Stanley Whing, Director of the Neighborhood Stabilization Program of the
New York City Commission on Human Rights (June 24, 1986). Also, there have
[Vol. XV
BLOCKBUSTING
New York Compilation of Codes, Rules and Regulations 13 2 and the
Administrative Code of the City of New York in footnotes,133 further
discussion will be limited to the three other laws.
A. The State Administrative Procedure Act
The Secretary of State has authority to issue cease and desist
orders pursuant to Title 19 of the Official Compilation of Codes,
Rules and Regulations. 13 4 Since this law does not designate the
number of petitions of community residents required to issue a cease
and desist order, the matter is left to the discretion of the Secre-
tary. Adjudicatory hearings need not be held, instead, the Secretary
of State sends the list of petitioning homeowners to all local bro-
kers. 35 By contrast, adjudicatory proceedings usually precede the
issuance of nonsolicitation orders. a6 The reason for this distinction
been only thirteen civil suits by New York City's Commission on Human Rights
from 1983 to date. Telephone interview with Harvey Fisher, Deputy Director of
the New York City Commission on Human Rights (Mar. 20, 1987).
A likely reason for failure to prosecute is that law enforcement officials are busy
solving crimes of more serious proportions. It is less likely that failure to prosecute
is "due to the difficulty of establishing beyond a reasonable doubt the requisite
criminal intent." Blockbusting, supra note 3, at 174. Suspension or revocation of
the broker's license is more practical because it directly prevents him from earning
a livelihood. See Novel Approach, supra note 9, at 564. Enforcement at the federal
level (Title VIII) is also in general decline. See Selig, supra note 120, at 469
(significant decline in initiating litigation after electioil of Ronald Reagan).
132. See supra notes 6-8, 13, 22, 26.
133. See supra notes 3, 17.
134. See supra note 13.
135. Sections 202(2) (notice and comment) and 301 (adjudications) of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act do not require adjudicatory hearings. See N.Y. ADMIN.
PROC. ACT §§ 202(2), 301 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1987). The cease and desist
order was a unique approach devised by the department. See Novel Approach,
supra note 9, at 556.
136. See, e.g., Nonsolicitation Order List, supra note 14 (various public hearings
described). The Secretary of State has the authority to issue nonsolicitation orders
pursuant to the Official Compilation of Codes, Rules & Regulations of the State
of New York. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 19, § 178.1 (1985); see also
supra note 7 and accompanying text. No statutory or departmental regulation
requires the Secretary of State to hold a public hearing. See id. § 178.3 ("[ulpon
reasonable notice to interested parties, the Secretary may conduct a fact-finding
hearing to ascertain the nature and extent of activities upon which such order may
be promulgated") (emphasis added). Adjudicatory proceedings are also afforded
to license suspensions and revocations. See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 441-e (McKinney
1968 & Supp. 1987). A suspension of the broker's license results in the suspension
of his salespersons. See id. § 441-d. In the event of revocation, the broker must
wait one year to be relicensed. See id. § 441-c(4) (McKinney 1968).
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is that a nonsolicitation order requires substantial evidence of block-
busting to survive judicial review.'37 The cease and desist petitions,
on the other hand, reflect varying degrees of neighborhood irritation
with brokers; homeowners, therefore, need not allege any wrongdoing
other than the wish not to sell their homes.
The second important way that the State Administrative Procedure
Act shapes law in this area is when a broker challenges the decision
of the Secretary of State to suspend or revoke his license.' Section
306 of the Act requires "substantial evidence" to support all de-
cisions, determinations, and section 307 orders. 39 Section 306, how-
ever, does not define substantial evidence. Rather, it merely indicates
that administrative proceedings need not follow the strict rules of
evidence observed by the courts.' 4° As a result, appellate cases contain
conflicting opinions-the majority finds substantial evidence to sup-
port the decision of the Secretary of State while the dissent considers
the evidence "mere uncorroborated hearsay allegations." 141 The de-
cision of the Secretary of State, however, prevails when the testimony
of different witnesses conflicts and reasonable men could differ as
to which testimony to accept.' 42
The final important measure of the State Administrative Procedure
Act is section 205 which allows judicial review of rules upon petition
pursuant to Article 78 of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. 43 For
instance, upon the decision of the Secretary of State to suspend or
137. See N.Y. ADMIN. PROC. ACT § 306.1 (McKinney 1984); see also infra notes
138-41 and accompanying text.
138. See, e.g., Hiltzik v. Lomenzo, 46 A.D.2d 855, 361 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1st Dep't
1974); Kamper v. Department of State, 26 A.D.2d 697, 272 N.Y.S.2d 808 (2d
Dep't 1966), aff'd, 22 N.Y.2d 690, 238 N.E.2d 914, 291 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1968);
Chiaino v. Lomenzo, 26 A.D.2d 469, 275 N.Y.S.2d 658 (1st Dep't 1966).
139. See N.Y. ADMIN. PROC. ACT § 306 (McKinney 1984).
140. See id.
141. Eagle v. Paterson, 83 A.D.2d 837, 837, 441 N.Y.S.2d 566, 567 (2d Dep't
1981), aff'd, 57 N.Y.2d 831, 442 N.E.2d 56, 455 N.Y.S.2d 759 (1982); see also
Jernigan v. Perales, 109 A.D.2d 838, 839-40, 486 N.Y.S.2d 364, 365-66 (2d Dep't
1985) (citing Eagle to show that "residuum rule" of sufficiency of evidence at
administrative hearings is no longer valid). The residuum rule required sufficient
legal evidence to support a claim. See Ayala v. Toia, 59 A.D.2d 739, 398 N.Y.S.2d
567 (2d Dep't 1977) (although hearsay is admissible in administrative proceedings,
there must be a residuum of legal evidence to support claim). But see Poerio,
Fairness in New York's Administrative Process: A Call for Revival of the Residuum
of Legal Evidence Rule, 57 N.Y. ST. B.J. 26 (Dec. 1985).
142. See Butterly & Green, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 43 A.D.2d 707, 709, 350 N.Y.S.2d
188, 192 (2d Dep't 1973) (Shapiro, J., dissenting), rev'd on other grounds, 36
N.Y.2d 250, 326 N.E.2d 799, 367 N.Y.S.2d 230 (1975).
143. See N.Y. ADMIN. PROC. ACT § 205 (McKinney 1984).
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revoke a broker's license, section 7803 of the Civil Practice Law
and Rules inquires "whether a determination . . . was arbitrary and
capricious or an abuse of discretion, including abuse of discretion
as to the measure or mode of penalty or discipline imposed."'
The judicial standard of review used to evaluate the order of the
Secretary of State to issue nonsolicitation and cease and desist orders
is, therefore, whether the action was "arbitrary and capricious or
an abuse of discretion.11 45 Although it is difficult for a broker to
overturn an order under this lenient standard of review, in Hawley
v. Cuomo, 46 the New York Court of Appeals found a two-county
nonsolicitation order to be "so broad in geographic scope" that it
was "arbitrary and capricious. ' 14 In Hawley, evidence showed that
brokers solicited homeowners in two specified areas more frequently
than in the past, but "there [was] no indication that the majority
of those solicitations were purposely infected with racially based
representations which placed undue pressure on those homeowners
to list their houses for sale.' ' 41 Hence, in evaluating nonsolicitation
and cease and desist orders, courts apply concepts of overbreadth 149
and vagueness.150
144. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. § 7803(3) (McKinney 1981). Section 205 of the
Administrative Procedure Act further requires that a potential article 78 petitioner
first request the Secretary of State to reconsider. See N.Y. ADMIN. Paoc. ACT
§ 205 (McKinney 1984). Inaction of the Secretary of State for thirty days renders
the request denied. See id.
145. Hawley v. Cuomo, 46 N.Y.2d 990, 991, 389 N.E.2d 827, 828, 416 N.Y.S.2d
232, 233 (1979) (quoting N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 7803(3) (McKinney 1981)).
146. 46 N.Y.2d 990, 389 N.E.2d 827, 416 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1979).
147. Id. at 992, 389 N.E.2d at 828, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 233.
148. Id. More recently, the court in Campagna v. Shaffer, upheld the non-
solicitation order of the Secretary of State, finding it neither arbitrary nor capricious.
See Campagna, 131 Misc. 2d 1029, 1036, 502 N.Y.S.2d 639, 644 (Sup. Ct. Bronx
County 1986).
149. See Hawley, 91 Misc. 2d at 18, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 991 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1977), aff'd, 61 A.D.2d 1046, 403 N.Y.S.2d 280 (2d Dep't 1978), aff'd,
46 N.Y.2d 990, 389 N.E.2d 827, 416 N.Y.S.2d 232 (1979). But see Bedford-
Stuyvesant Real Estate Bd., Inc. v. Lomenzo, 39 A.D.2d 742, 742, 332 N.Y.S.2d
266, 267 (2d Dep't 1972) (nonsolicitation order of July 8, 1971 covering Laurelton-
Cambria Heights in Queens would have been enjoined for its "unlimited scope"
had court not dismissed case for lack of standing); Thompson v. Lomenzo, 78
Misc. 2d 298,. 303, 356 N.Y.S.2d 760, 766 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1974), aff'd,
48 A.D.2d 869, 369 N.Y.S.2d 191 (2d Dep't 1975) (geographical boundaries of
nonsolicitation order clearly delineated and order well suited to deal with specific
problem of excessive or illegal solicitation).
150. See State Comm'n for Human Rights v. Suburban Assocs., Inc., 55 Misc.
2d 920, 924, 286 N.Y.S.2d 733, 739 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1967) (commission's
1987]
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B. Article 15 of the Executive Law: The Human Rights Law
Section 290 of Article 15 of the New York Executive Law-the
Human Rights Law-declares itself to be an exercise of the police
power of the state and states its purpose to be, in part, "to eliminate
and prevent discrimination ... in housing accomodations."''11 De-
claring that equality of opportunity is a civil right, the law ensures
equal opportunity to use and occupy housing accomodations without
discrimination. 15 2
Section 296 is the New York State counterpart to the Fair Housing
Act. 53 Like section 3602, section 296 provides many examples of
unlawful discriminatory practices. 5 4 It specifically outlaws block-
busting.'55 The law prohibits sellers, renters, and assignors from
printing or circulating any statement, advertisement or publication,
for the purchase, rental, or lease of a housing unit "which expresses,
directly or indirectly, any limitation, specification or discrimination
as to race, creed, color, national origin, sex, or disability or marital
status."'15 6 Like the section 3603(b) exemption, these sections do not
apply to rentals in single or two-family homes.'
Section 296 also outlaws steering. 5 ' Since steering practices tend
to be devious, subtle, and elusive, the Secretary of State's finding
order to broker to make all listings available to prospective purchasers was "far
too vague" because "prospective purchasers" might be shoppers, testers, or even
competitors), modified on other grounds, 34 A.D.2d 662, 310 N.Y.S.2d 1019 (2d
Dep't 1970); see also Thompson, 78 Misc. 2d at 301-02, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 764-65
(order not unconstitutionally vague because it gave fair notice to any person of
ordinary intelligence that soliciting properties for purchase or sale was forbidden).
151. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 290 (McKinney 1982).
152. See id.
153. Compare id. § 296 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1987) with 42 U.S.C. § 3604
(1983).
154. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1987).
155. See id. Section 296(3-b) provides:
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any real estate broker
... to represent that a change has occurred or will or may occur in
the composition with respect to race, creed, color, national origin or
marital status of the owners or occupants in the block, neighborhood
or area in which the real property is located, and to represent, directly
or indirectly, that this change will or may result in undesirable conse-
quences ... including but not limited to the lowering of property values,
an increase in criminal or anti-social behavior, or a decline in the quality
of schools or other facilities.
Id. § 296(3-b).
156. Id. § 296(5)(a)(3).
157. See id.
158. See id. § 296(5)(c)(1). Section 296(5)(c)(1) states:
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of steering after a hearing is conclusive when " 'others might rea-
sonably make the same choice.' "1,9 This holding applies even if the
victim fails to testify at trial.1'6
C. Section 441-c of Article 12-A of the Real Property Law
Section 441-c of New York's Real Property Law empowers the
Department of State to suspend or revoke a broker's license or
impose a fine of up to $1,000. '61 As head of the Department of
State, the Secretary's delegated authority is neither narrow nor doubt-
ful: "Where an administrator is clothed by the [1legislature with the
responsibility of licensing and disciplining a calling, he must not be
denuded of the commensurate authority to punish those licensees
who violate professional standards unless his measures are shockingly
unfair. "1
62
A ground for a finding of steering or blockbusting is "untrust-
worthiness.' 1 63 Thus, a broker has a duty to maintain high ethical
standards-mandated by both common law principles of fiduciary
and agency relationships and New York statutory law. Racially
discriminatory real estate practices are indicative of untrustworthi-
ness, as is charging exorbitant fees ' 6 and having a conflict of interest
(self dealing). 165 The term "untrustworthiness" is necessarily broad
It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any real estate broker
... [to] refuse to sell, rent, or lease any housing accomodation . . . to
any person or group of persons ... because of the race, creed, color,
national origin, sex, or disability or marital status . . . or otherwise to
deny or withhold any housing accomodation . . . because of race ....
Id.
159. See Mid Village Realty, Inc. v. New York State Comm'n for Human Rights,
59 Misc. 2d 651, 654, 300 N.Y.S.2d 483, 487 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County 1969)
(citations omitted), aff'd, 34 A.D.2d 794, 311 N.Y.S.2d 977 (2d Dep't 1970).
160. See id.
161. See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 441-c (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1987).
162. Butterly & Green, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 36 N.Y.2d 250, 258, 326 N.E.2d 799,
804, 367 N.Y.S.2d 230, 236 (1975).
163. See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 441-c (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1987). Other
grounds for penalties include, but are not limited to, misstatement on license
application, fraud, misleading advertising, and incompetence. See id.
164. See Gold v. Lomenzo, 35 A.D.2d 1054, 1054-55, 316 N.Y.S.2d 830, 833
(3d Dep't 1970), modified on other grounds, 29 N.Y.2d 468, 280 N.E.2d 640, 329
N.Y.S.2d 805 (1972); see also Contract Buyers League v. F & F Inv., 300 F. Supp.
210, 214-16 (N.D. Ill.) (excess fees related to discrimination), aff'd sub nom. Baker
v. F & F Inv., 420 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 821 (1970).
165. See Kostika v. Cuomo, 41 N.Y.2d 673, 677, 363 N.E.2d 568, 571, 394
N.Y.S.2d 862, 865 (1977) (suspension of broker for obtaining "ill-gotten profit").
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in order to vest the Secretary of State with wide discretion. 66 Courts
have repeatedly rejected the contention that the Secretary of State
has insufficient power to make determinations of untrustworthiness
based on discriminatory acts. 167 In short, most courts base their
decisions on a finding of untrustworthiness. 61
D. Effectiveness of Laws Prohibiting Blockbusting and Steering
Numerous suspensions and fines have generated shock waves
throughout the real estate brokerage industry. Because obtaining
listings is fundamental to the broker's ability to earn a living,
nonsolicitation and cease and desist orders directly limit a broker's
earning capacity. Since these orders apply to a large number of
brokers simultaneously without litigation of complaints they are
effective in broadcasting the message that discriminatory real estate
practices will not be tolerated.
Nevertheless, while the Secretary of State appears to have a sta-
tutory arsenal for enforcing penalties for discriminatory real estate
practices, judicial review of his orders has often resulted in their
dilution and nullification. 69 As previously stated, courts invalidate
nonsolicitation and cease and desist orders on grounds of vagueness,
overbreadth, and arbitrariness. 70 Extensive litigation has sometimes
resulted in the imposition of a $350 fine and restitution, 7' a one
month suspension or, in lieu of suspension, a $500 fine,172 or even
a reduction of penalties and a reprimand.173 Courts have also shown
166. See id.; Birch v. Lomenzo, 31 A.D.2d 835, 835, 298 N.Y.S.2d 281, 283
(2d Dep't 1969) (while Secretary of State must establish knowledgeable violation
of state law, he "has wide discretion in determining what conduct constitutes
'untrustworthiness' 
").
167. See Diona v. Lomenzo, 26 A.D.2d 473, 477, 275 N.Y.S.2d 663, 668 (lst
Dep't 1966); see also Thompson v. Lomenzo, 78 Misc. 2d 298, 305, 356 N.Y.S.2d
760, 767 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1974), aff'd, 48 A.D.2d 869, 369 N.Y.S.2d 191
(2d Dep't 1975).
168. Section 441-c does provide for other grounds, such as incompetence and
fraud, see supra note 163, but their elements are more difficult to prove.
169. See infra notes 170-75 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 145-50 and accompanying text.
171. See Mid Village Realty, Inc. v. New York State Comm'n for Human Rights,
59 Misc. 2d 651, 652, 300 N.Y.S.2d 483, 485 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County), aff'd,
34 A.D.2d 794, 311 N.Y.S.2d 977 (2d Dep't 1969).
172. See Eagle v. Paterson, 57 N.Y.2d 831, 442 N.E.2d 56, 455 N.Y.S.2d 759
(1982).
173. See Butterly & Green, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 43 A.D.2d 707, 350 N.Y.S.2d 188
(2d Dep't 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 36 N.Y.2d 250, 326 N.E.2d 799, 367
N.Y.S.2d 230 (1975) (some petitioners suffered only reprimand, others were fined
$50, and others suspended).
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leniency to first offenders by reducing the revocation penalty to
suspension 74 because revocation amounts to a denial of a broker's
livelihood' 75-an excessively harsh penalty when the discriminatory
act is isolated in nature and is not part of a continuing or systematic
pattern.
IV. Recommendations
The administration and enforcement of such penalties must be
improved. Currently, the maximum fine the Secretary of State may
impose for untrustworthiness under section 441-c of the Real Property
Law is $1,000.176 Twenty years ago, $1,000 may have been a sub-
stantial deterrent, but today it may be viewed as a nominal cost of
doing business. The fine is not enough to deter a blockbusting or
steering broker who can earn much larger commissions from racially
pressured sales. 77 Raising the maximum fine to $50,000 would clearly
serve as a warning that New York will not tolerate discriminatory
practices by brokers. The imposition of higher fines is also a better
alternative to suspension of a broker's license because suspension
has the disadvantage of simultaneously putting potentially innocent
salespersons in the broker's employ out of work. A higher fine,
however, is necessary to put some teeth into the law.
It is clear that the law will be ineffective without sufficient ad-
ministrative personnel to enforce it. Hence, it should not be subject
to politics-that is, cutbacks in funding following a change in admin-
istration. City, state, and federal legislators should make long-term
budgetary commitments to ensure that present laws, representing a
century of struggle to achieve racial equality, do not wilt and wither
into oblivion as a result of lack of funding.
174. See Kranzler Realty, Inc. v. Department of State, 76 A.D.2d 901, 429
N.Y.S.2d 244 (2d Dep't 1980).
175. See Blatchly v. Department of State, 83 A.D.2d 845, 845, 441 N.Y.S.2d
755, 755 (2d Dep't 1981); Bernard-Charles, Inc. v. Cuomo, 58 A.D.2d 535, 536,
395 N.Y.S.2d 656, 657 (1st Dep't 1977). See generally BISKIND, supra note 58,
§ 36.01.
176. See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 441-c (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1987).
177. Brokers' commissions are somewhat negotiable, but typically range between
five and eight percent in the metropolitan New York City area. In the bargaining
process, it is not uncommon for the broker to settle for a lower percentage when
the price of the home is relatively high or to insist on a higher percentage when
the price is relatively low. Brokers' commissions are not fixed by statute or regulation.
See Gold v. Lomenzo, 35 A.D.2d 1054, 1055, 316 N.Y.S.2d 830, 834 (3d Dep't
1970), modified on. other grounds, 29 N.Y.2d 468, 280 N.E.2d 640, 329 N.Y.S.2d
805 (1972).
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The currently unenforced penal sanctions available under section
442-e of the Real Property Law of New York 78 and section 8-204
of the Administrative Code of the City of New York,179 however,
should be stricken. Since profit, as opposed to racism, motivates
most brokers, civil remedies should be sufficient to promote equal
housing without placing brokers behind bars. In addition to a fine
or suspension imposed upon the broker, the homeowner victimized
by blockbusting should be able to recover the difference between
the fair market value of his home and the actual selling price created
by panic instilled by the broker; the buyer victimized by blockbusting
should likewise be able to recover the difference between the inflated
price he paid for the house and its fair market value. The feasibility
of including such damages in determinations by the Secretary of
State ordering a fine or suspension should be studied.
V. Conclusion
No published reports have studied the effectiveness of nonsoli-
citation and cease and desist orders in New York. While some
federal and state cases deal with discriminatory practices in housing,
the full extent of steering and blockbusting is unknown. Considering
the subtlety of steering behavior and blockbusting tactics, it is likely
that much goes unnoticed and unreported. The mere fact that com-
plaints are made to the Secretary of State, does not mean a reportable
case will emerge or that such complaints will, be statistically signif-
icant. 10 Some controversies settle before full judicial adjudication.'
178. See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 442-e (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1987).
179. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, ch. 2, § 8-204 (1986).
180. Contact with the Department of State revealed that there were no studies
indicating either: (1) how many brokers have been subject to fines, license suspension
or revocation resulting from violation of cease and desist or nonsolicitation orders;
or (2) the volume of complaints against brokers after the issuance of such orders
as compared with just before. Telephone interview with Bernard Friend, Special
Projects Manager, Division of Licenses, New York State Dep't of State (May 15,
1987).
181. On June 19, 1986, a class comprised of black plaintiffs alleging steering
practices and a defendant housing development corporation reached an agreement.
See Notice of Proposed Settlement, Mandel v. Fresh Meadows Assocs., N.Y.
Newsday, July 18, 1986, at 7, col. 2 (E.D.N.Y. June 19, 1986). Plaintiffs alleged
violations under, inter alia, 42 U.S.C. § 1982, 42 U.S.C. § 3604, and section 296
of the Executive Law of New York. See id. The complaint indicated the use of
testers and alleged that among the tactics used to steer blacks away from Fresh
Meadows was the underlining in red of the letter "M" in Fresh Meadows on their
applications to indicate that the applicant was black. Telephone interview with
plaintiffs' counsel, Teitelbaum & Hiller, P.C. (July 18, 1986).
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Study of the problem is complicated by social attitudes, economic
considerations, and demographic shifts.
Twenty years ago, this area of the law was virtually uncharted.
Today, the Fair Housing Act and the recently revitalized section
1982, along with state and local laws, curb discrimination by pro-
viding an enforcement arsenal that deters discriminatory real estate
practices by punishing violators at both federal and state levels. The
modern realtor now realizes that steering and blockbusting are illegal
and could put him out of business. Nonsolicitation and cease and
desist orders against real estate brokers in New York advance the
promise of fair housing by throwing a wet blanket over specific
neighborhoods ignited by panic selling. While they are not a cure-
all for racial tension, such orders effectively target local brokers of
victimized neighborhoods, so that transitions may occur naturally
without the brokers' undue influence.
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